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I
INTRODUCTION
Reform of Texas family property law has been significantly restrained by the
conclusion of the Supreme Court of Texas in 1925 that the marital property
system is constitutionally defined.' If the court felt that recourse to the state
constitution was required to save the underlying doctrine of Texas marital
property from being subverted by ill-conceived legislative efforts to improve the
legal lot of married women,2 it may have been correct. A major tenet of the
system was thereby preserved,3 and subsequent pressures for legislative change
were removed due to reduced legislative power. Without the decision of 1925,
however, the system could have been developed very differently.
While Texans have gradually lifted most fundamental inhibitions by
amending the constitution itself, the Texas Supreme Court's failure to formulate
consistent principles of matrimonial property law has encouraged resort to
statutory reform as the principal means of legal modernization. On its face, the
Texas Constitution gave no hint of the interpretation put upon it in 1925. It
seemed merely to define the wife's separate property.4 But before the language
of the constitution was formulated in 1845, a correlative relationship between
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1. Arnold v. Leonard, 273 S.W. 799 (Tex. 1925); Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 273 S.W. 808
(Tex. 1925); Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Refining Co., 274 S.W. 120 (Tex. 1925). The authors of the
constitutional provision meant it to serve as a deterrent to legislative tampering with the rights of
married women. See WILLIAM F. WEEKS, DEBATES OF THE TEXAS [CONSTITUTIONAL] CONVENTION
597, 601-02 (1846). But the judicial interpretation of 1925 greatly magnified the scope of the provision.
2. Prior to the early years of the twentieth century, the wife had almost no role under law in the
control of marital property. Reform began in 1911, not by bringing her into the management of the
community, but by authorizing her to become a sole trader on her separate account. See infra notes 70-
72 and accompanying text. Then, in 1915, the bulk of the wife's recovery for personal injuries-which
had been all community property under prior case law-were reclassified as her separate property. 1915
Tex. Gen. Laws 251, § 1. This cutting back of the community continued in 1917 with legislation declaring
rents and profits of the wife's separate property (as well as the husband's) to be separate. 1917 Tex.
Gen. Laws 436, § 1; see infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
3. The Hispanic principle that the revenues from separate property are community had been
statutorily abandoned in 1917. See supra note 2.
4. See infra note 31.
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separate and community property had existed.5 The Reception Act of 1840 had
specifically defined the common estate of spouses as the property other than that
defined as their separate properties. 6
The Act of 1848, from which all later definitions of community property were
derived, stated the definition similarly7 and restored the Hispanic balance
between separate and community property from which the 1840 statute had
departed. After 1848 the small number of applicable statutes conformed to
Hispanic principles and left only a few novel issues to be decided judicially by
application of Anglo-American principles. As the draftsman of the constitutional
definition and author of many of the early opinions on the subject,' the state's
first Chief Justice, John Hemphill, forged the principal links between the
Hispanic past and the future law.
The evolution of the system can be divided into three major periods of
development.9 The first period began with legislative perpetuation of the
Spanish law of marital property during the 1840s and continued until 1913 with
the courts maintaining full control of the system. The second period (which
began in 1913 and ended in 1967) was active and chaotic, with the legislature and
the courts both struggling to adjust the "constitutionalized" system to a changing
society. The final period runs from 1967"- when gender discrimination was
eliminated in a major reform-to the present. This last quarter century has been
marked by vigorous efforts to deal with old and new problems, though little in
the way of philosophical bases can be distilled from these developments. Texas
spouses now enjoy some-but by no means unlimited" t-freedom in dealing
with their marital property inter se, but neither the supreme court nor the
legislature adheres to a pro-community or a pro-separate property stance.
Over half a century ago, Professor Richard Powell, a major force in
American property law and negative critic of the principle of community
property, characterized the system as a "conservative power"12 of familial
5. 1839-1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 3, §§ 3-4, at 4, reprinted in 2 H.P.N. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 177,
178 (1898).
6. Id. § 4, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 178.
7. 1847-1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 77, § 3 at 78, reprinted in 3 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 77, 78.
8. See Scott & Solomon v. Maynard, Dallam 548 (Tex. 1843); Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621 (1846);
Cartwright v. Hollis, 5 Tex. 152 (1849); Hollis v. Francois, 5 Tex. 195 (1849); Edington v. Mayfield, 5 Tex.
363 (1849); Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 13 (1851); Huston v. Curl, 8 Tex. 239 (1852); Christmas v. Smith,
10 Tex. 123 (1853); Wright v. Hays' Adm'r, 10 Tex. 130 (1853); Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211 (1855);
Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314 (1856); Higgins v. Johnson's Heirs, 20 Tex. 389 (1857).
9. This same division is made in Joseph W. McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course
of Development and Reform, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 117 (1971), revised in ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY
PRESENTED TO CLYDE EMERY 30 (1975).
10. The Matrimonial Property Act of 1967 became effective on January 1, 1968. The drafters'
commentary on the proposed act is reprinted in Commentary to the Matrimonial Property Act of 1967,
17 TEX. TEcH L. REv. 1319 (1986).
11. JOSEPH W. McKNIGHT & WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY LAW 20
(1983) lists six possible provisions for characterization of property as community or separate that, under
present law, would be void if included in an antenuptial contract or a similar contract between spouses.
12. Richard R.B. Powell, Community Property---A Critique of Its Regulation of Intra-Family
Relations, 11 WASH. L. REv. 12,38 n.125 (1936) (quoting GEORGE MCKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
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orientation. It is, but judicial attitudes in Texas have undergone a change of
focus. From the early decisions of John Hemphill through the 1925 decision
constitutionalizing marital property law, the apparent judicial goal was to
preserve the old, Hispanic principles and thus to protect the wife's interest in the
co-owned marital estate while giving her almost no role in its management. In
recent decades, the Texas Supreme Court has faced a series of issues with no
solution in the Hispanic past. Old Spanish law did not recognize divorce for
postmarital causes; therefore, no traditional answers were provided for the
questions posed by the increasing incidence of marital breakdown. Other new
issues have arisen because the judiciary has had to deal with types of property
interests, such as employees' retirement pension plans, that did not exist in the
Hispanic legal setting. Until 1987, the Texas Supreme Court was, however,
prevented by statute 3 from reviewing questions arising on divorce that did not
pose precedential, statutory, or constitutional conflict, and the court was
sometimes inclined to shield itself from consideration of such matters when it
could use the statute to do so.
Since 1925, the legislature has generally been conservatively inclined in
addressing matters of family property law. Although in 1967 Texas was the first
community property jurisdiction in the United States to eliminate gender
discrimination from the laws of community management, the solution chosen is
not now viewed as progressive. Texas's concepts of sole and joint management
of community property" are built on the notion of two communities dating
from 1913.15 None of the other eight community property states has followed
Texas in removing gender discrimination from the rules of management in this
way. All other community property states have chosen a partnership approach,
usually described as an "equal" management system.
1 6
II
STAGE I: ADOPTION OF THE COMMUNITY REGIME BY CONSTITUTION AND
STATUTES WITH JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF ITS HISPANIC ROOTS
As a liberal response to the repressive attitude of English law toward the
property rights of married women, in 1840 the Congress of the Republic of Texas
enacted a definition of the elements of marital property law largely derived from
Spanish doctrine embodied in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825.17 The
OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 73, at 65 (2d ed. 1925)). See also 4A RICHARD R. POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY § 625[3] (1992).
13. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 22.001, 22.225 (West 1988).
14. As used here, as in Texas practice, the term "joint" management means that both spouses must
act in concert to perform a valid act in relation to a particular property interest. See TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 5.22(b), (c) (West 1993); McKNIGHT & REPPY, supra note 11, at ch. 9.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74.
16. This term means that either spouse acting alone can deal with a community asset. See WILLIAM
A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 14-1 (3d ed. 1991).
17. See McKnight, supra, note 9, at 32. Insofar as this definition did not comport with the Hispanic
model, the departure was cured by the statutes of 1848. See supra note 7.
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centerpiece of the Spanish system was the marital partnership, to which both
spouses contributed the profits of their wealth and efforts and in which each
acquired half ownership in all gains accrued during marriage."8 Unlike the
husband, the wife could not assert her half interest in those gains of the marriage
until the marriage was dissolved by the husband's death,19 as divorce in the
modern sense was unknown. Throughout the marriage, as well as at its
dissolution, each spouse under Spanish law maintained separate property
interests brought to the marriage or acquired during marriage by gift or
inheritance. E' In 1840, Texas community property acquired its strongest
protective device with the enactment of the community presumption:21 If it is
established that an asset was acquired during marriage or was possessed by a
spouse on dissolution of the marriage, a spouse or a spouse's heir claiming a
separate interest must prove it.' A spouse seeking recovery for a separate
contribution to the marriage or a community contribution to a separate asset of
the other spouse must assert a claim for reimbursement in the partition of
common assets after marital dissolution.'
The Spanish matrimonial property law had been in effect in Louisiana since
1769 and was codified in the Louisiana Digest of 1808 and recodified in the Civil
Code of 1825.24 Among the Anglo-Americans settling in Texas in the 1820s
and 1830s, some from Louisiana had legal training or had Louisiana law books.
These and other lawyers who settled in provincial Texas seem to have concluded
that the civil law of Louisiana and that of Mexico were essentially the same, and
in most matters of concern to them, they were correct. During the period of
colonization under Mexican rule, the Anglo-American newcomers became
familiar with the Spanish matrimonial property system as it was transmitted in
terms of Louisiana law. The system was appealing insofar as it empowered the
wife to become co-owner of wealth acquired during marriage and comported
18. See FUERO REAL 111.3.1-3 (1255). Law 1 gave a general definition of common property of
spouses, each of whom was entitled to half of the gains of marriage. Law 2 defined earnings of the
marital partners as constituting their common property, and gifts and inheritances as separate property.
Law 3 stated that the fruits of separate property were common property. These laws were perpetuated
as NUEVA RECOPILACION V.9.24 (1567); NOViSIMA RcoPILACION X.4.1-3 (1805).
19. See JUAN DE MATIENO, COMMENTARIA IN LIBRUM QuINTuM RECOLLECTIONIS LEGUM
HISPANIAE on RECOP. V.9.2, gloss 3, no. 18 (1580).
20. Id. on RECOP. V.9.3, gloss 6, no. 1. See also id. on RECOP. V.9.2, gloss 3, no. 10.
21. See 1839-1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 6, § 12, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 180. Its Spanish
antecedents were LEYES DE ESTILO 23, RECOP. V.9.1, and Nov. REc. X.4.4.
22. MATIENQO, supra note 19, at V.9.1, gloss 2, no. 1.
23. See ANTONIO AYERVE DE AYORA, TRACTATUS DE PARTITIONIBUS, BONORUM COMMUNIUM
INTER MARIUM ET UXOREM ET FILIOS AC HAEREDES EORUM 1.10.2 (1586); FUERO REAL, supra note
18, at 111.4.9.
24. 1808 LA. DIG. 111.5.1-98, at 322-45; LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2305-2410 (1825). When the Digest was
enacted in 1808, the Spanish law had been in effect in Louisiana for almost 40 years. See BIBIANO
TORRES RAMREz, ALEJANDRO O'REILLY EN LAS INDIES 115-18 (1969); 2 FRANCoIS XAVIER MARTIN,
THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 14 (1829).
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with the realities of frontier conditions under which both spouses stood together
against natural and human forces.'
Despite their familiarity with this Hispanic doctrine, the politically dominant
Anglo-Americans had casually established the Anglo-American law of dower in
January of 1839.26 In January of the following year, however, the Congress of
the Republic of Texas repealed the law of dower27 and enacted a regime of
marital sharing in the same act by which the English common law replaced most
existing Spanish legal institutions.' The scheme as initially adopted did not
carefully replicate Hispanic doctrine, however. Texas common property was
more broadly defined to consist of all property of the spouses except lands and
slaves brought into marriage and those acquired by gift or inheritance during
marriage.29 Five years later, a convention assembled to draft a constitution for
Texas as an American state. John Hemphill promoted a provision to protect the
property of married women,' with further protection for the surviving spouse
when the common estate was inadequate. A minority of the committee favored
a mere direction to the legislature to pass laws for the protection of the rights of
married women along the lines of a community property system. The language
of compromise that resulted defined the separate estate of married women in the
Spanish terms of Louisiana law and left to the legislature the task of formulating
a clear definition of common property31
In 1848, statutes were enacted that defined the separate estate of each spouse
along the lines of the constitutional definition of the wife's separate estate. The
25. Cf. Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19
BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 32-33 (1967) (repeating the vivid hypothesis that spousal sharing of marital gains
arose among Visigothic tribes because wives fought and worked shoulder to shoulder with their
husbands).
26. 1838-1839 Tex. Gen. Laws 149, §§ 1-8, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 149-51.
27. 1839-1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 172, § 1, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 172; McKnight,
supra note 9, at 120.
28. 1839-1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 3, §§ 3-4, at 4, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 177-78.
29. McKnight, supra note 9, at 120. The 1840 statute used the phrase "common property" to refer
to the spouses' mutual gains during marriage. If it had been fully understood that the Spanish common
estate was merely a half-interest in property, much of the later complexity of the system might have been
avoided.
30. See WILLIAM F. WEEKS, DEBATES OF THE TEXAS [CONSTITUTIONAL] CONVENTION 486, 504
(1846). The Judiciary Committee of which John Hemphill was chairman proposed the following section:
19. No law shall ever be passed, vesting in the husband, by virtue of the marriage, the
separate property of the wife, as now recognized by law, or depriving her of the portion of
the common property to which she is now entitled.
The proposed § 18 provided that the legislature authorize "a suitable provision, out of the estate of the
deceased wife or husband for the surviving partner where the husband or wife may have died rich,
leaving the other in necessitous circumstances .... " Id. at 596.
31. TEx. CONST. OF 1845, art. VII, § 19 provides that:
All property, both real and personal, of the wife, owned or claimed by her before marriage,
and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be her separate property; and
laws shall be passed more clearly defining the rights of the wife, in relation as well to her
separate property, as that held in common with her husband.
The 1876 Constitution maintained the same text. TEx. CONST. OF 1876, art. XVI, § 15. See also
McKnight, supra note 9, at 123.
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common property was defined as the rest of their acquisitions during marriage.32
The community was made liable for all of the husband's debts and those of the
wife contracted during marriage for necessaries. 33  The husband was given
control of the common estate, and (in a lapse into English legal ideology) the
separate estate of the wife was put under the husband's management as well. 34
Thus the control of the spouses' property in Texas generally replicated that of
Anglo-America prior to reform, though ownership was significantly different.
Because the Texas wife retained the Hispanic right of will-making,35 she could
dispose of her half-share of the common property.
After enacting a further statute to regulate the payment of marital debts
against a deceased spouse's estate,36 the legislature left the elaboration of the
system to the courts as responses to particular disputes demanded. In the course
of judicial development, the decisions of the Texas Supreme Court achieved a
fortuitous blend of Anglo-American and Hispanic principles of marital property
law.
Most significantly, the Texas courts embraced the Anglo-American principle
of tracing, by which separate property might maintain its identity through
mutation. The tracing principle was first enunciated in Love v. Robertson,37 an
1851 case involving a slave purchased during marriage with both community
funds and a husband's separate funds. The court held that ownership resulted
in proportion to the amount of the total price paid with each type of funds. The
decision thereby reduced the breadth of the marital community in Texas. 3 By
relying on the equitable tracing doctrine, the court achieved a result more
consistent with English law, which sought to preserve sole ownership whenever
32. 1847-1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 77, § 3, at 78, reprinted in 3 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 77-78. The
community presumption was not restated but was still in effect from the 1840 enactment. 1839-1840 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3, § 12, at 6, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 177.
33. 1847-1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 77, § 3, at 78, reprinted in 3 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 77-78. The
wife was thus acting as the husband's agent of necessity. She had no independent contractual power at
that time.
34. 1847-1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 77, § 2, at 78, reprinted in 3 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 77.
35. 1839-1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 167, § 1, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 341.
36. 1856 Tex. Gen. Laws 51, §§ 1-9, reprinted in 4 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 469-71.
37. Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851).
38. No overt anti-community bias appears in the Love opinion, however. The court nevertheless
found the question difficult. It is apparent that neither the court nor counsel had access to Spanish
materials that would have disclosed the historic solution. According to the case reporter's summary of
the briefs, the only Spanish authority cited by the losing party was White's Recopilacion. JOSEPH M.
WHITE, A NEW COLLECTION OF LAWS, CHARTERS, AND LOCAL ORDINANCES OF THE GOVERNMENTS
OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND SPAIN, RELATING TO CONCESSIONS OF LAND IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
COLONIES TOGETHER WITH THE LAWS OF MEXICO AND TEXAS ON THE SAME SUBJECT (1839)
(reprinting IGNACIO JORDAN DE Asso Y DEL RIO & MIGUEL DE MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, INSTITUCIONES
DEL DERECHO DE CASTILLA (6th ed. 1805) (Lewis F.C. Johnston, trans.)). The pages dealing with
community property law are reproduced in McKNIGHT & REPPY, supra note 11, at 6-8. In Love,
prevailing counsel cited a Louisiana decision, which the court said was not on point, to the effect that
when a husband managing the wife's separate property sold an asset and reinvested the proceeds in other
property, the rule of tracing applied. The attorney's primary point was that the statute defining the
husband's separate property as including property owned before marriage would be eviscerated by
rejecting the tracing principle. Ultimately the court simply declared that "[e]quity and justice" required
acceptance of the tracing rule.
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possible. The Spanish law would have held that the acquisition during marriage
was community even if made entirely with the husband's separate property.
Spanish law recognized a very narrow application of the tracing principle,
confined to exchanges of landed patrimony or immediate reinvestment of
proceeds from its sale; the principle of reimbursement was relied on to
compensate the separate estate in other situations.39 The Texas Supreme Court,
however, followed the Anglo-American solution to establish the doctrine of
tracing separate property through changes in form in order to preserve its
character as separate. Love is the first of many Texas Supreme Court cases
favoring separate property ownership over a community claim when there is no
clear statutory answer.
A similar fusion of disparate principles was achieved in relation to
interspousal gifts. Along Anglo-American lines,' a presumption of gift was
indulged when the husband bought property with his separate estate in his wife's
name and when he made a transfer to his wife of his separate estate or property
held in common.41 These were instances when Hispanic legal norms were very
different from those of Anglo-America. In an effort to protect heirs who were
beneficiaries of the Spanish doctrine of forced heirship, Spanish law was hostile
to all interspousal gifts.42 But in the case of alleged donative transfers, the
Texas court did not mention the Hispanic tradition, either because of lack of
awareness or because Texas had abolished the doctrine of forced heirship in
1856, when the first dispute of that kind came before the court. In the case of
a husband's purchase of property with community funds in the name of his wife,
however, the court entertained no presumption of gift and required proof of
donative intent,43 as under Spanish law. Some shrinking of the breadth of the
Texas marital community, therefore, resulted from application of the presump-
tion of gift in cases of a community transfer (as distinguised from purchase). In
judicial decisions concerning sales of property of a deceased wife when the
property was held in her husband's name, however, the court favored the bona
fide purchaser as against her heirs." In this instance, as in the tracing decisions,
the Texas court was, without any conscious reflection on the broad consequences
of the decisions reached (and usually without making any conscious choice
between Anglo-American and Spanish solutions), applying equitable commercial
standards to the subject matter of Spanish marital property law, which had
usually subsisted outside the mainstream of commerce.
39. LEYES DE ESTILO 203 (1310), REcOP. V.9.1 (1567), NoV. REC. X.4.4 (1805). See MATIENCO,
supra note 19, at gloss 2, nos. 4-5; 2 JOSEF FEBRERO, LIBRERfA DE ESCRIBANOS (FEBRERO MEJICANO)
11.10.7 (1834).
40. See 5 WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 442 (1989).
41. Story v. Marshall, 24 Tex. 306 (1859); Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314 (1856).
42. See SIETE PARTIDAS IV.11.4-5 (1256). A gift to a spouse (or to anyone else) effectively reduced
the estate that Spanish law preserved for heirs.
43. Higgins v. Johnson's Heirs, 20 Tex. 389 (1857).
44. Patty v. Middleton, 17 S.W. 909 (Tex. 1891); Cooke v. Bremond, 27 Tex. 457 (1864).
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The Texas Supreme Court was, nevertheless, sufficiently imbued with
Louisiana's Hispanic tradition of family property law that in 1859 it maintained
the Hispanic rule characterizing income from separate property as community.45
Although the California Supreme Court almost simultaneously adopted the
Anglo-American approach of attributing income from separate property to the
separate estate of the owner,' the Texas court followed the traditional Hispanic
path. 7 The court did not rely on the constitutional provision, however, but on
"[t]he principle that lies at the foundation of the whole system of community
property.., that whatever is acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and
wife, shall be their common property."' These contrasting developments are
more remarkable when the statutes defining community property then in force
in both states are considered. Texas's statute lent itself to the interpretation that
income from separate property was separate,49 whereas the California stat-
ute-held invalid there on the ground that the state constitution protected
"separate property" as understood in Anglo-American law--clearly provided that
such income was community. Texas's adherence in 1859 to the old Spanish rule
was thus conservative, but the result was nonetheless progressive in the sense
that on her husband's death the full range of profits of marriage were evenly
divided.5 ° It was a time when divorce was very rare.
When the Texas Supreme Court finally focused on the concept of reimburse-
ment in a dispute involving community benefits rendered to a separate estate
during marriage, it recognized this principle also in Hispanic terms. 1 Because
the same rule measured reimbursement in cases where a separate estate made
a claim based on improvement of the community (for example, paying for
construction of a house on community land) as when the community estate made
the claim based on improvement contributed to separate property, the general
rule chosen cannot be viewed as favoring the community over the separate
estate.52 But for the measure of recovery, the conclusion was the Hispanic
norm of cost without any apparent consideration of analogous Anglo-American
standards.53
45. De Blane v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 23 Tex. 25 (1859).
46. George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322, 332-33 (1860).
47. De Blane, 23 Tex. at 29.
48. Id. at 29.
49. It included in a spouse's separate estate the "increase" of his or her separate property. 1847-
1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 77, § 2, reprinted in 3 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 77.
50. By 1859 a number of common law states, including nearby Arkansas and Mississippi, had
adopted matrimonial property regimes, which in some measure defined a wife's premarital property and
its income like that of an unmarried woman. See infra note 68. But the Anglo-American widow's rights
were little improved.
51. Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58, 66-67 (1858) (an unusual case in which the husband sought a divorce
on the ground that his wife had continually beaten him); Furrh v. Winston, 1 S.W. 527 (Tex. 1886). In
each case a building had been constructed at community expense on the separate land of one spouse.
52. The improving estate obtained no share of title and was entitled to be reimbursed for the cost
of the improvement (funds spent and valaue of community labor).
53. The prevailing Anglo-American rule was that a cotenant who had improved the cotenancy was
entitled to compensation for enhancement in the value of the property only upon partition of the
cotenancy. See A.C. FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTITION § 510, at 680 (2d ed. 1886); Annotation,
[Vol. 56: No. 2
TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Perhaps because of the mechanical ease with which the rule was applied,
after some vacillation the Texas court adhered' to the Spanish inception of title
principle in distinguishing between property interests brought into marriage (and
thus separate) and those acquired during marriage, which are shared.55 Hence,
if a property right was rooted in a contract that antedated the marriage, the
property interest that might mature during marriage was a separate interest.
Unlike most other community property states,56 Texas has continued to apply
this principle broadly-as, for example, to the characterization of proceeds of a
life insurance contract entered into before marriage but kept in force with
community premium payments during marriage.5  Because the Spanish
principle of reimbursement allows the community to recover the amount paid in
making premium payments for a separate insurance policy bought before
marriage, the community does not share in the enhanced value of the whole life
policy, which is the only type to which Texas courts have ever directed their
attention. Thus, by preventing the community from becoming co-owner of a
spouse's separate premarital acquisitions, the Texas court allowed modest
shrinkage of the possible breadth of community assets but did so in accordance
with Hispanic antecedents.
58
Adjustment on Partition of Improvements Made by Tenant in Common, 1 A.L.R. 1189, 1202-03 (1919).
Because enhancement was the measure of Anglo-American compensation, cost of improvement was
rarely mentioned in the cases. In the course of a business cotenancy to which most Anglo-American
cases were devoted, wasting repairs (such as replacement of a roof) would ordinarily have been made
by agreement of the cotenants and paid for out of rents. The cost of an uncompensated improvement
that produced enhancement valued at less than cost rarely suggested judicial comment.
54. See Welder v. Lambert, 44 S.W. 281, 283-87 (Tex. 1898).
55. See ALFONSO DE AZEVEDO, COMENTARIORUM IURIS CIVILIS IN HISPANIAE REGIAS
CONSTrUTIONES on RECOP. V.9.2, no. 16 (1594); 1 JOSEF FEBRERO, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOS:
JuicioS 1.4.1.23 (3d ed. 1786).
56. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 16, at 6-1 through 6-15.
57. McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381,383-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd). At this
time, in California and most other community property states the solution to the problem in McCurdy
was ownership shared pro rata. Thus, if at the time of characterization of the policy or proceeds the
husband's separate estate had paid $5,000 in premiums before marriage and the community thereafter
paid $15,000, the asset was one-fourth separate and three-fourths community. See Modern Woodmen
of America v. Gray, 299 P. 754 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). The most recent California decisions dealing
with term life insurance policies classify the policy or proceeds based on the nature of the most recent
premium paid. But see Estate of Logan, 236 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that prior
payments should be credited if the insured had become uninsurable so that such payments were
significant in purchasing the right of reinsurance).
58. Unlike a Texas life insurance policy acquired before marriage-and thus an entire separate
interest (subject to a community right of reimbursement for payment of premiums)-Texas courts have
treated an employee pension plan acquired before marriage as owned pro rata by the separate and
community estates in proportion to the employee's periods of employment when single and married.
Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976); Busby
v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
The character of proceeds of a separate life insurance policy may be effectively altered by applying
the new measure of reimbursement for improvement to realty. See infra note 136 and accompanying
text. By applying the new standard of reimbursement to a separate life insurance policy (not subject to
decrease in value unless the insurance company fails), its value will be enhanced as a result of payment
of premiums with community property, and the community will be entitled to reimbursement for the
enhanced value, not merely for premiums paid. Thus, when the insured spouse dies, the proceeds of the
policy will be apportioned in a manner similar to that applicable to retirement benefits. On divorce, the
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Perhaps the most remarkable consequence of blending of Anglo-American
and Hispanic concepts produced, and in turn resulted from, legislation
concerning succession to property at death. The Anglo-American inclination to
keep ownership of property within the blood line of the decedent was evident in
the Texas statutes on intestate succession to separate property, which followed
the pattern of English law in favoring the decedent's heirs with a mere life estate
of one-third in favor of the surviving spouse.59 An independent provision was
made for succession to community property, and here the Anglo-American
inclination to avoid cotenancy is evident, to the detriment of collateral heirs.
Because one-half of the common estate belonged to a surviving spouse, all of the
deceased spouse's half passed to lineal heirs, and in their absence the decedent's
half was reunited with the other half in the hands of the surviving spouse.'
This difference in rules of succession produced a notion of separate and
community interests as different types of property; this disparity was accentuated
by the lawyers' habit of referring to "the separate estate" and "the community
estate." For the Spanish lawyer, the difference had merely been that of a
particular spouse's owning a separate whole interest or a common half interest.
Anglo-Texans, however, thought of the two interests as different types of
property, and the peculiar word "community," derived from the French
communauti used in Louisiana, fortified this difference.61
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Texas courts-with rare
exception 62-no longer looked to Louisiana or Spanish sources for guidance in
community will (in effect) have a pro rata share of the cash surrender value of the policy, subject to
equitable division.
59. 1839-1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 132, § 10, at 134, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 306, 308;
1847-1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 129, § 4, at 130-31, reprinted in 3 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 129, 130-31.
The life estate in the wife with a remainder to the decedent's heirs also produced eventual unified
ownership in cases when the heir was a single child. The alternative mode of intestate succession might
have given an undivided half interest to the widow (who could then devise her half to anyone) and an
undivided half interest to the child who was sole heir. Intestate succession involved creation of a
cotenancy when more than one child (or other issue) were heirs, because Anglo-American jurisdiction
had abolished primogeniture by 1800. See Richard B. Morris, Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in
America, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 24, 25, 51 (1927); Carole Shammas, English Inheritance Law and Its
Transfer to the Colonies, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 154 (1987).
60. 1839-1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 3, § 4, at 4, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 177, 178 (1898);
1847-1848 Tex. Gen. Laws 77, § 3, at 78, reprinted in 3 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 77, 78.
61. 1825 LA. CIV. CODE art. 2371, in effect when Texans began to use the term "community"
property, begins "This partnership or community consists of all the profits of all the effects of which the
husband has the administration .... " ("Cette soci6tA ou communaut6 se compose des fruits de tous les
biens dont le mari a l'administration .... "). In Spanish the term for community property is bienes
ganaciales. See JOAQUIN ESCRICHE Y MARTIN, DICCIONARIO DE LEGISLACI6N CIVIL, PENAL,
COMERCIAL Y FORENSE 71 (1st ed. 1831). The Texas Constitution and earliest statutes referred to
"common" property, not community. The term "community" appears one time in Hemphill's opinion
in the first significant Texas marital property case in 1843, Scott & Solomon v. Maynard, Dallam 548,
which repeatedly uses the word "common." Regular use of "community" rather than "common" seems
not to begin until Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 13 (1851).
62. For some instances in which the Texas court continued to look to Louisiana Law, see
Richardson v. Hutchins, 3 S.W. 276 (Tex. 1887); Welder v. Lambert, 44 S.W. 281 (Tex. 1898).
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matters of matrimonial property.' To say that a distinctly Texas system had
developed would be an exaggeration, however, because there were still many
gaps of undefined doctrine. Divorce was not sufficiently prevalent to have
presented many problems for judicial solution, and therefore most matrimonial
problems before the courts arose in the context of debt-collection and succession.
Elements of Anglo-American law had been applied to some aspects of the
system, but despite some departures, Texas law maintained the principal features
of the Hispanic model.
Departing from old Spanish authority' (which does not seem to have been
consulted) the Texas Supreme Court of the late nineteenth century also
produced a body of authority' that evidenced a marked hostility to spousal
agreements (marital as well as premarital) that sought to alter the statutory
community regime. Though not consistent in its reasoning, the court tended to
be guided by the statutory prohibition of premarital agreements to alter the
order of descent.' In 1902 this conclusion was, in effect, generalized to bar
agreements to change the character of separate property to community,
67
though the court did not rely on the earlier line of authority. The Texas
Constitution was not mentioned.
III
STAGE II: THE WAYWARD PROCESS OF REFORM, 1911-1967
The reform of Texas matrimonial property law in the second and third
decades of the twentieth century was the long delayed completion of the
movement to expand the property rights of married women' that was initiated
by the perpetuation of the community property system in 1840. As adherents to
a minority marital property system, the community property states were cut off
from the mainstream of American property law reform. Each community
property state was further isolated by the peculiar details of its own system. In
63. Nor did the courts of Texas and those of the western community property states often look to
each other.
64. Under old Hispanic law, spouses could, prior to marriage, formally contract for a marital
property regime different from that set forth in the codes and other sources of law. Old Spanish law also
allowed spousal agreements during marriage to alter the marital regime. MATIENqO, supra note 19, at
gloss 1, no. 60; on Recop V.9.9, gloss 1, nos. 2,5. But there were serious doubts that such alterations
affected the rights of heirs and creditors. See 2 SANCHO LLAMAS Y MOLINA, COMENTARIO CRfTICO,
JURIDICO, LITERAL, A LAS OCHENTA Y TRES LEYES DE TORO 314 (3d ed. 1853).
65. Proetzel v. Schroeder, 19 S.W. 292 (Tex. 1892) (marital agreement); Groesbeck v. Groesbeck,
14 S.W. 792 (Tex. 1890) (marital agreement); Green v. Ferguson, 62 Tex. 525 (1884) (formal premarital
agreement revoked by marital agreement); Cox v. Miller, 54 Tex. 16 (1880) (marital agreement); Wallace
v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 35 (1876) (informal marital agreement).
66. 1839-1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 3, § 5, at 5, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 177, 179.
67. Kellett v. Trice, 66 S.W. 51 (Tex. 1902) (marital agreement).
68. It was certainly a delayed reaction. The first married women's property acts appeared in
Arkansas in 1835 and Mississippi in 1839. This type of reform, giving the wife most of the property
rights and contractual powers that were ordinarily provided in an Anglo-American premarital settlement
of the early nineteenth century, was adopted in New York in 1848. See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR.,
CoMMuNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 2 (2d ed. 1988).
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the case of Texas, isolation was made more pronounced by the state of
development that the system had reached by the early twentieth century. Texas,
like some of the other community property states, was slow to see the need for
reform because of the locally generated myth of the great liberality of her system
toward married women.
In Texas the drive for equality in rights to property was closely associated
with the women's suffrage movement.69 The first fruit of this effort in Texas
was enacted in 1911: a statute permitting a married woman to petition for
judicial removal of the disabilities of coverture for business purposes and to
acquire full contractual power in that context.70  By that time, such "sole
trader" statutes were not a novelty in common law marital property states and
some community property states. 71 Even though the husband's consent was
required in the Texas process,72 the statute represented a considerable advance
in married women's rights.
Allowing married women to conduct their own businesses within the
community property system suggested shifting a part of the management of the
community property to them. The 1911 sole trader law, thus, seems to have
provided the impetus for broad marital property law reform as well as its course.
In 1913, an act entitled "Husband and Wife-Defining Separate and
Community Property, 73 gave wives control of their earnings and the profits
from their separate estates. 74  There were limitations, but the husband's sole
control of the community estate was broken. Instead of a single marital
partnership with the husband as managing partner, two partnerships emerged if
the wife had property of her own or produced earnings: The wife became the
managing partner of the second partnership, which consisted of the income from
her separate property and her earnings. To "protect" the married woman from
the imposition of third persons, the 1913 Act required the husband's joinder for
disposition of community lands or securities she managed,75 but her manage-
69. The two related movements sought and achieved their objectives almost simultaneously. Jane
Y. McCallum, Woman Suffrage, in 2 WALTER PRESCO'rr WEBB, THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS 928 (1952).
See McKnight, supra note 9, at 124 n.44 and accompanying text.
70. 1911 Tex. Gen. Laws 92, §§ 1-4. Section 4 gave the wife as a feme sole full contractual capacity
and declared her separate property liable for the debts incurred in her business. The statute did not
classify her earnings in such a business as separate property and did not say that they were liable for her
debts as community property. Potential lenders could not have relied on being able to reach community
property in the feme sole's business even though the loan was taken out to expand the business. The
poorly drafted sole trader law was finally repealed by 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 2707, § 6 at 2733. See
McKnight, supra note 9, at 124.
71. For example, California had very soon after statehood enacted laws permitting wives to qualify
as sole traders. 1852 Cal. Stat. 101. Unlike Texas, California made the earnings of a feme sole her
separate property.
72. McKnight, supra note 9, at 124.
73. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 61, § 1 at 61-62. See William 0. Huie, Commentary on the Community
Property Law of Texas, 13 VERNON'S TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 1, 39-40 (1960).
74. McKnight, supra note 9, at 125.
75. Prior to the 1913 legislation, the husband was the manager of all the community estate though
the wife was required to join in conveyances of the homestead, and the husband managed the wife's
separate property, subject to her joinder in conveyances. Under the 1917 legislation (supra note 2), the
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ment powers over a part of the community were assured, and that part
committed to the wife's control was protected from her husband's creditors. The
fundamental partnership principle of Texas community property law was
nonetheless maintained. Indeed, it was expanded by giving wives some
management power, whereas previously their participation in the marital
partnership had been confined to co-ownership.
The most significant impediment to the married woman's exercise of
proprietary rights was her lack of full contractual power.76 As proposed and
initially enacted, the 1913 statute had given full contractual capacity to married
women, but in response to Governor Colquitt's objection,' the bill was recalled
and the provision was deleted. The law as passed had considerably less impact
on Texas spouses and their business practices than if the original provision had
been included.
Other reforms were enacted to enhance the property rights of Texas married
women at almost every regular legislative session from 1913 until 1923. In 1915
a married woman's recovery for personal injury was statutorily characterized as
her separate property.7" In 1917 a much broader reform was enacted. Texas
followed the plan of California and the other western community property states
(except Idaho) 79 in defining the income from both spouses' separate property
as belonging wholly to its owner.' In a decade Texas law had been radically,
though not systematically, transformed. Most significantly, the unity of the
marital partnership had not been maintained.
husband was also required to join in conveyances and encumbrances of the wife's separate lands and
securities. In the case of both separate and community assets, a court could waive the husband's refusal
to join upon finding that the transaction the wife wished to enter into was in her best interest.
76. A married woman who had complied with the sole trader statute could bind her separate estate
by her contracts. See 1911 Tex. Gen. Laws 92, §§ 1-4. Her contracts did not bind her interest in the
community estate under that act, however. But the wife had broad contractual powers under the 1913
act, subject to certain limitations. See supra note 75. See also Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Refining Co.,
274 S.W. 120, 121-22 (Tex. 1925); Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 273 S.W. 808 (Tex. 1925); Whitney
Hardware Co. v. McMahan, 231 S.W. 694, 695-96 (Tex. 1921).
77. See Red River Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, 206 S.W. 923, 926 (Tex. 1918), for a summary of the
legislative history of the 1913 act.
78. 1915 Tex. Gen. Laws 103, § 1; McKnight, supra note 9, at 125. Previously, all personal injury
recovery obtained on behalf of either spouse had been characterized as community property. That
purported application of the disjunctive syllogism has been described (with roughly equal clarity) as
giving community property a "waste basket" definition. Marriage of Parsons, 622 P.2d 415, 416 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1981), overruled by Marriage of Brown, 675 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Wash. 1984). Such recovery was
not property owned before marriage or acquired by succession or gift and thus was community property.
See Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883) (recovery for wife's injuries).
The kind of gender discrimination in this and several other reforms discussed here could be
attacked today as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution (not to mention the Texas Equal Rights Amendment of 1972, see infra note 102). It was
not until 1971 that the United States Supreme Court held that gender discrimination denied equal
protection. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Legislation intended to correct for prior discrimination
against women has also been upheld. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
79. See GEORGE MCKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 286, at 208 (2d
ed. 1925).
80. McKnight, supra note 9, at 125 (citing 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 436, § 1). An amendment of 1921
dealt with liability of separate property. 1921 Tex. Gen. Laws 251, § 1.
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Just after the legislature had adopted its general consolidation of family
property law in 1925 (by which the wife's control of her earnings had been
omitted by apparent oversight), the Texas Supreme Court considered three
cases"1 dealing with the right of a husband's creditor to be satisfied from the
rents and profits from the wife's separate property, redefined in 1917 as her
separate property not subject to the husband's debts. Evidently troubled by the
speed and extent of reform of married women's property rights, the court
resorted to the constitutional provision to restore, as far as it could, its
perception of the proper role of married women in Texas property law. In
nullifying the 1917 reform, which made income from separate property separate,
the court held that the constitutional provision on marital property was the sole
source of the definition of that estate. By necessary implication, the constitution
thus required that any property not specifically defined as separate property was
community.'
Although the court chose to rely wholly on Texas sources (the supposed
definition supplied by the constitution and legislative recognition of that fixed
doctrine), the Hispanic tradition went unmentioned, but it is evident that
legislative custom and judicial decision had continued to rest on that tradition.'
The court noted that the Texas legislature had the power to alter the rules of
management and liability of community property but not the fundamental
definitions that had been fixed by legislative acquiescence. For the first
time-eighty years after the constitutional provision on marital property had
been adopted-the court asserted that the constitution controlled the definitions
of community and separate property. That assertion by the court caused a major
shift in the analysis of matrimonial property law. In severely fettering both
legislative and judicial reform, the court's 1925 decision stands as the most
conservative bulwark in the history of Texas matrimonial property law.
A desultory repair of the constitutionally infirm statutes was not undertaken
until 1929.8 It was generally assumed thereafter, as the statute continued to
provide,s' that the husband's place as manager of the entire community had
been restored. The statute exempting the income from the wife's separate
81. See supra note 1.
82. Arnold v. Leonard, 273 S.W. 799, 804 (Tex. 1925). The statutory provision making the rents
and profits of the wife's separate property not liable for her husband's debts was, nevertheless, severable
from the unconstitutional provision classifying those rents and profits as her separate property. Hence,
the husband's creditors ultimately did not prevail.
83. Id. at 802-03. The California Supreme Court, dealing with the identical constitutional language
in 1860, had reached precisely the opposite result by holding that "separate property" as a common law
term of art embraced rents and profits. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. Although unmen-
tioned, the Hispanic tradition was very much stronger in Texas in 1925 than in California in 1860. See
supra note 30. Until 1980 the Texas Constitution, specifically defined the wife's separate property only
and directed the legislature to deal with the "common property."
84. 1929 Tex. Gen. Laws 66, § 1; McKnight, supra note 9, at 126. The disorderly state of the 1925
statutory revision after the 1925 judicial decisions had been noted by Frank Bobbitt, Is There More Than
One Class of Community Property in Texas?, 4 TEX. L. REV. 154, 163 (1926).
85. 1925 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4619, § 1: "during coverture [the common property of the
husband and wife] may be disposed of by the husband only .... "
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property from liability for the husband's debts was nevertheless left intact. This
circumstance prompted a most daring move on the part of the Texas Supreme
Court: to revive the wife's management of community rents and profits from her
separate property despite the 1925 repeal of the statute conferring that power.
In 1932 in Hawkins v. Britton State Bank' and later in Bearden v. Knight,'
the court so concluded, even though the statutory revision of 1925 had omitted
a section specifically stating that a wife had management of the income from her
separate estate.88
The years of the Great Depression produced little reform of private law and
little thought of such reforms." But social attitudes changed markedly during
the war years and the decade that followed to produce demands for legal change.
Women had joined the work force in significant numbers, and their participation
in business and the professions increased. The first significant reform of the
post-war years was, nonetheless, unrelated to women's rights, as such. Instead,
it was a reaction to the result of applying the 1925 constitutionalized definition
of community property to bar spousal agreements to alter the character of
community assets. Obviously, the state legislature cannot waive constitutionally
created rights, but citizens ordinarily can.9' In 1947 the Texas Supreme Court
held that a married couple's physical division of community personalty into equal
shares of separate property was constitutionally ineffective.91 This 1947 decision
precluded Texans from reducing estate taxes owed under a federal act of 1942.'
The only avenue for reform was to change the constitution itself. An amend-
ment was immediately proposed to allow married couples to partition their
existing community property into two separate shares. Although the federal tax
86. 52 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1932). This was an opinion of the Commission of Appeals adopted by the
Texas Supreme Court.
87. 228 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. 1950). This was a decision of the Texas Supreme Court after expansion
in 1945 from three to nine members to include the Commission of Appeals. The court overruled First
Nat'l Bank of Lewisville v. Davis, 5 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Comm'n. App. 1928, judgm't adopted). See also
Chandler v. Alamo Mfg. Co., 140 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, no writ); William 0. Huie,
Some Principles of Texas Community Property Law, 15 LA. L. REv. 605, 632-37 (1955).
88. In both instances the court inferred the wife's power from her authority to manage her separate
property and the husband's lack of power to subject the revenues from her separate lands to liability for
his debts. Hawkins, 52 S.W.2d at 245-46; Bearden, 228 S.W.2d at 844.
89. The general broadening of personal property exemptions for family-debtors was a significant
exception. See 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws 384, § 1. See also McKnight, supra, note 9, at 126, n.56.
90. See McKNIGHT & REPPY, supra note 11, at 19, noting the curiosity of Texas constitutional
decisions that allow a citizen to waive the right to jury trial and the right against self incrimination
(waivers affecting perhaps years of liberty), but which bar a waiver by a married person of the property
rights created in article XVI, §§ 15 (marital property definition) and 50 (homestead protection).
91. King v. Bruce, 201 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1947).
92. The congressional act had included in the estate of the spouse who died first all the community
property except that which was shown to be traceable to earnings of the survivor or to income from the
survivor's separate property. For many couples there was, therefore, a great advantage in partitioning
community property into two shares of separate property (as a tenancy in common or divided shares),
especially if they thought that the spouse who was the sole producer of income would die first. See C.M.
Hudspeth, Minimizing Federal Estate Taxes in Community Property States, 24 TEx. L. REV. 483 (1946).
In 1948 Congress recognized each spouse as a half-owner of the community property for estate tax
purposes. See current 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (1988): "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent the time of his death."
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law was changed prior to the 1948 election at which the amendment was
presented to the people,93 the amendment was nevertheless adopted.94
Although the Texas Supreme Court had shown a willingness to repair
legislative oversights of 1925 and 1929, these heroic responses" to prior
legislative efforts to give married women a share of the management of the gains
of marriage were not consistently maintained. In 1938' and again in 1963,9
contrary conclusions were reached. These inconsistencies and uncertainties of
the statutes and their judicial interpretations caused legal academics to discuss
a systematic reform of the law, but their voices were rarely heard beyond the law
schools. Women's groups complained about the law's injustice towardwomen,
and they began to press for a constitutional amendment to remove gender-based
discrimination. All of their grievances were not directed toward marital property
law, but within that sphere they objected to the continued dominance of
husbands over community property, the need for the husband's joinder in his
wife's transfer of her separate land and securities, and the "protective"
requirement of a married woman's acknowledgement of her formal transfer of
separate property to be taken by an official outside the presence of her husband.
An extensive study of the status of married women was therefore mounted in the
mid-1950s, but the legislative proposals that emerged from it met with very little
success.98 Thwarted by legislative intransigence in their efforts to achieve
statutory reform, the proponents of change pressed harder for a constitutional
amendment to eliminate all gender-based discrimination.' In 1963, the reform
movement achieved its first real success with the enactment of legislation
granting full contractual capacity to married women and providing them with
substantially unfettered control of their separate property.1°°
93. See McKnight, supra note 9, at 126 n.59 and accompanying text.
94. The substantive addition to art. XVI, § 15, provided that spouses,
without prejudice to pre-existing creditors, may from time to time by written instrument...
partition between themselves in severalty or into equal undivided interests all or any part
of their existing community property, or exchange between themselves the community
interest of one spouse in any property for the community interest of the other spouse in
other community property, whereupon the portion or interest set aside to each spouse shall
be and constitute a part of the separate property of such spouse.
95. Hawkins, 52 S.W.2d at 243; Bearden 228 S.W.2d at 837.
96. Strickland v. Wester, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (Tex. 1938) (mutations of wife's earnings were not
protected from husband's creditors).
97. Moss v. Gibbs, 370 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1963) (following Strickland v. Wester, the court reached
the same conclusion).
98. See 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 1233; TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LEGAL STATUS OF MARRIED
WOMEN IN TExAS (1956). The 1957 amendment authorized a married woman at least 21 years old to
convey separate lands, stocks, and bonds without the consent of her husband if she filed an election with
the county clerk "to have sole management, control, and disposition of her separate property."
99. See McKnight, supra note 9, at 127-28.
100. 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 1189, § 6. The need for a privy acknowledgment of a married woman's
transaction was not unequivocally abolished until 1967, however. See Eugene L. Smith, Legislative Note:
1963 Amendments Affecting Married Women's Rights in Texas, 18 Sw. L.J. 70, 72 (1964). In 1965, the
law with respect to suits by or against married women was revised, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1010, §§ 1-3,
and grounds for divorce were made gender-neutral, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1634, § 1.
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When put to a referendum of the Texas bar, the proposed equal rights
amendment failed by a margin of two to one.10 1 Some academic lawyers who
were sufficiently aroused by the erratic state of the statutory law had already
begun drafting proposals for reform. Feeling a responsibility to follow the
expressed view of the bar and sensing the potential dangers of the constitutional
amendment, 1°2 bar leaders embraced the efforts of the academics as a means
of deflecting the amendment. Although the first effort failed for lack of time in
the 1965 legislative session,0 3 a more polished measure was passed in 1967, to
be effective on January 1, 196 8.1'4 Having thus been thrust into marital
property law reform, the organized bar has continued to be the leading player
in this field. 5
IV
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS HAVE LOOSENED BUT NOT
DETACHED JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE TIES FROM OLD TRADITIONS
Substantial stability in Texas matrimonial property law has been achieved by
the fact that almost every successive effort toward statutory reform has been
built on the structural base of prior rules. The 1913 revision of the laws drew on
101. See McKnight, supra note 9, at 129.
102. Considerable gender discrimination remained in Texas law, and a chaotic situation would have
developed in both civil and criminal matters if an equal rights amendment had been adopted without
gender-neutral rules in place or ready to take effect. If, for example, the husband had sole management
of the commingled mix of his earnings and his wife's separate property, his control would have been
unconstitutional under both the Texas Equal Rights Amendment and the federal Equal Protection
Clause as later applied to marital property. Wessely Energy Corp. v. Jennings, 736 S.W.2d 624,626 (Tex.
1987); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981). But what was the appropriate solution: equal
management, joint management, or management by each of a share of the community estate?
An Equal Rights Amendment (TEx. CONST. OF 1972, art. I, § 3a) was finally adopted in 1972 after
gender-neutralizing reforms had been legislatively put in place, effective Jan. 1968. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws
LVII.
103. See McKnight, supra note 9, at 130.
104. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 735. For a brief summary of these activities, see McKnight, supra note
9, at 41-42.
105. After the bar's proposed reform was enacted in 1967, bar leaders responded quickly to criticism
of phraseology. For example, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (West 1993) was amended, at the bar's
urging, in response to the interpretation of the placement of an adjective in Muller v. Evans, 516 S.W.2d
923 (Tex. 1974).
Once it became apparent that personal liability of spouses had not been specifically addressed in
the code, the legislature passed appropriate amendments at the bar's urging. See Joseph W. McKnight,
Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 21 TEx. TECH L. REV. 911, 1048 (1990); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 4.031, 5.61 (West 1993).
Bar leaders have also played major roles in obtaining legislation relating to disposition of property
on divorce. The following statutes are also due to their efforts: TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.63(b)
(property acquired while spouses were domiciled elsewhere); 3.631 (spousal agreements for division of
property on divorce); 3.632 (interests in insurance policies); 3.633 (retirement benefits); 3.70-.77
(enforcement and clarification of orders); 3.90-3.93 (property not dealt with on divorce); 5.02 (burden
of proving separate property ownership; 5.41-5.56 (premarital agreements and marital partitions).
The bar has been less willing to take on the more difficult tasks of resolving its drafting errors
carried into the Family Code in the sections concerning joint management and liability of the community
for a spouse's torts. See McKnight, supra note 105, at 911, 1077; Joseph W. McKnight, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, Family Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 90 (1976); cf. MCKNIGHT & REPPY, supra note 11, at 184.
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the cumulative judicial experience under nineteenth century statutes as analyzed
in the first Texas treatise on marital property,"° whose author drafted the
legislation."° Apart from two further editions that responded to the 1913
reforms in the first instance3o' and the effect of judicial assessment of legislative
reform in the second,"° the scholarly literature was sparse during the interwar
period, though some academic training was offered on the subject, and
collections of teaching materials were prepared for that purpose. An increase
in scholarly writing and teaching books that organized the subject systematic-
ally"' greatly contributed to the order of subsequent proposals for reform.
As a consequence of the bar's adjustment to the two-partnership community
regime, the 1967 reform perpetuated rather than abandoned the concept of a
divided community. Gender neutrality was therefore to be achieved by giving
sole management of community property to the spouse whose property or efforts
generated the gain and giving management of community property not subject
to sole management to the spouses jointly.' A minority sentiment among the
drafters of the 1967 statute favored community management and liability along
the lines of a business partnership, but all those engaged in the project for
reform appreciated that a system formulated in terms of past experience was the
only plan that could be enacted at the time.
Although the Texas managerial scheme of two partnerships with different
spousal managers is unique among American community property systems, n2
it provides merely the standard system. Spouses are free to fashion a scheme for
property management more suitable to their own needs."n In practice, the
majority of Texas couples conduct their affairs as a regime that is largely equally
controlled, n 4 and thus many of the objectives of a true partnership are realized.
Though the act of 1967, as codified in the Texas Family Code in 1969,115 did
106. OCIE SPEER, THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN IN TEXAS (1901).
107. Hortense Ward, Shall Women Have Adequate Laws?, 7 TEx. MAG. 239, 241 (1913).
108. OCIE SPEER, THE LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS (1916).
109. Id.
110. The most significant of these were WILLIAM 0. HUIE, TEXAS CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF MARITAL RIGHTS (1955) and its sequel, WILLIAM 0. HUIE, TEXAS CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1966).
111. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (West 1993).
112. Some other community property states also allow sole management of certain community assets
in particular situations. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 16, at 14-1 through 14-10.
113. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.43 (1987); LeBlanc v. Waller, 603 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (separating spouses' oral agreement, by which each would
have sole management of community property that each possessed, limited the rights of their future
creditors).
114. That is, each spouse ordinarily deposits his or her earnings in the same bank account. The
result is a jointly managed account subject to their contract of deposit with the bank, which ordinarily
provides for equal management in that each spouse can write checks or make withdrawals. With respect
to items purchased from the mixed fund, the spouses manage them jointly unless they agree to sole
management of items that each buys with funds withdrawn from the mixed account. It may be
understood, for example, that the wife can sell or give to charity clothes she has purchased by drawing
on the mixed account.
115. The 1969 code lifted the 1967 reforms out of the Revised Civil Statutes with some changes in
phraseology not intended as substantive. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (West 1993) (the
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not constitute a complete codification of Texas family property law in the sense
that the entire subject was reduced to statutory form, the systematic presentation
of the law was far more complete than any prior restatement or revision.
Two sections of the Family Code presented direct challenges to the Supreme
Court of Texas to rethink its rigid classification of property as community or
separate. One asserted more legislative freedom to classify; the other, more
spousal freedom to recharacterize community property as separate property
interests. Section 5.01 characterized as a spouse's separate property a recovery
of damages in tort for bodily injury to the extent that the recovery does not
include compensation for loss of earning power. The constitutional dogma of
1925 would have classified these recoveries as community along with all other
acquisitions during marriage not acquired by gift or succession. As early as 1883,
the entire recovery had been adjudged community property as a matter of
statutory rather than constitutional interpretation.116 By shifting the focus of
constitutional interpretation from the language of the constitution to its historical
roots, the Texas Supreme Court in Graham v. Franco..7 upheld the new
statutory treatment of damages for bodily injury, but the decision did not alter
the constitutionalized rules of classification. Thus, the Texas legislature now
seems precluded from returning to a rule classifying as community property all
aspects of recovery for a spouse's personal injuries during marriage.
The historical approach to constitutional interpretation did not last, however.
The notion that article XVI, section 15, rested fundamentally on Hispanic
principles was silently put aside six years later in Williams v. Williams,"' when
the court returned to its linguistic straightjacket in dealing with interspousal
transactions. Williams involved the second statutory challenge in the 1967 reform
and the 1969 Family Code. It provided that "persons intending to marry may
enter into a marital property agreement as they may desire."'119 In Williams, the
management statute).
116. Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331 (1883).
117. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
118. 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978).
119. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.41 (West 1993) (emphasis added). In response to the constitutional
amendment of 1980 and dissatisfaction with an intermediate statutory change in 1981, this version of the
statute was further changed in 1987 by adoption of the Texas Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, of
which TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.43(a)(1) (West 1993) carries forward without substantive change the
constitutionally questionable invitation to persons planning to marry to make any kind of prenuptial
agreement they desire. Section 5.43(a)(7) states that such a contract may include a choice-of-law
provision concerning the "construction" of the agreement. Silence concerning a choice of law respecting
validity seems deliberate. Evidently, a couple cannot go to some other state where freedom of contract
principles prevail, execute a prenuptial agreement for a general community (that is, no separate property
for either party), specify in the contract that the law of the place of execution will govern, and return
to Texas to marry and live with a valid contract. See Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc., 817
S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1991) (contractual rights are determined by the law of the jurisdiction having the most
significant contacts with the transaction if the parties have not chosen other governing law); DeSantis
v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 755 (1991) (even if the
contracting parties have chosen the law of a particular state to govern their relations generally, Texas
law is still properly applied to govern specific matters, such as the validity of a noncompetition clause,
if Texas has a materially greater interest in that issue); Robertson v. Estate of McKnight, 609 S.W.2d 534
(Tex. 1980) (applying the most significant contacts rule to characterize interspousal tort recovery between
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parties formally contracted four days before marriage to live separate in
property. The marriage was dissolved by the husband's death five months later.
In a dispute between the widow and her husband's heirs, the Supreme Court said
that
the agreement was void to the extent that income or other property acquired
during marriage should be the separate property of the party who earned or
whose property produced such income or acquisition. Such provisions were no
more than a mere agreement between the parties to establish the character of
the property prior to its acquisition during marriage in violation of both the
Texas Constitution and the Family Code. ... "
Graham was not cited. Although old Spanish authority supported prenuptial and
spousal contractual alteration of the community marital regime,121 that Hispanic
tradition had not been as consistently maintained as some commentators have
suggested.122 Late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Texas authorities
severely condemned spousal agreements to alter community property,1 3 and
it was generally understood by the Texas legal profession that these decisions
reflected Spanish law of the early nineteenth-century. 24 Thus, the view
enunciated in Williams was consistent with nineteenth-century authorities, their
supposed Hispanic underpinning, and the rigorous doctrine of constitutional
interpretation adopted in 1925."2
To abrogate the rule interfering with spousal power to partition community
property, another constitutional amendment was necessary. Once again,
apparent loss of benefits under federal estate tax law (imposed exclusively on
Texas due to the restrictive decisions of her supreme court1 26) assisted leaders
of the bar in proposing an amendment and in procuring an affirmative vote in
favor of reform.127
foreign domiciliaries); King v. Bruce, 201 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1947) (Texas spouses went to New York and
there unsuccessfully attempted a community partition in kind).
120. Williams, 569 S.W.2d at 870.
121. See supra note 64.
122. See supra note 64. See also WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 59, at 116 (2d. ed. 1971) (freedom to fashion conventional regime by
antenuptial contract a "cardinal precept" of Hispanic law).
123. See supra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text.
124. Joseph W. McKnight, Spanish Law for the Protection of Surviving Spouse in North America, 57
A.H.D.E. 365, 389-91 (1987).
125. See Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d. 855 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgm't adopted).
126. In Revenue Ruling 75-504, 1975-2 C.B. 363, the Internal Revenue Service took the position that
when one spouse made a gift of separate property of his half of the community to the other spouse and
the donor died, the gift was in his estate because of a retained interest to receive income therefrom
under § 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Idaho, the donor's intent to give away all interests was
respected, but it was assserted that in Texas a donor could not make income of separate capital likewise
separate.
127. Although Estate of Wyly v. Comm'r, 610 F.2d 1282, 1290-94 (5th Cir. 1980), decided shortly
before the vote of the people to amend the constitution, rejected the position of the Revenue Service,
the amendment was nonetheless adopted.
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Late nineteenth-century authorities and the strict doctrine of constitutional
interpretation also produced a line of decisions forbidding spousal agreements
to create a right of survivorship to community property. The Texas Supreme
Court held that a formal spousal undertaking that attempted to convert
community funds directly into a joint tenancy was void, and a statute purporting
to authorize such an agreement was unconstitutional. To achieve their goal,
spouses were required to make two distinct agreements, one changing the
community property to a tenancy in common (and thus separate property of each
by halves) and a second changing the tenancy in common property to a joint
tenancy.1'2 Because neither bankers (who commonly advised them) nor the
spouses wishing to achieve survivorship to their community property could seem
to master the appropriate procedure for doing so,129 a further constitutional
amendment was required in 1987 to allow a simpler process."
Although the pace of constitutional change was slow, once the Texas
Constitution was amended in 1980 and 1987, the legal air was cleared of much
of the dogma generated in 1925. In 1991, the Texas Supreme Court revised its
conclusion in Williams v. Williams:131 The agreement before the court to live
separate in property was merely voidable and not void, and thus the invalidity
of a similar agreement entered into prior to the 1980 amendment was cured by
an implied legislative intent that the amendment should have retrospective
effect.13 2  The court (which had been wholly reconstituted since the 1980
amendment) did not comment on the constitutional character of the transaction
as a partition but merely referred to it as an agreement between intended
spouses to which the law should give effect. There was no intimation of a need
to protect the community estate from contractual encroachment.
Some other matters have been more forthrightly treated as public policy
decisions both by the court and by the legislature. After examining the
reimbursement problem at long intervals and under a variety of economic
conditions over a period of more than a century,3 3 the measure of reimburse-
ment was resolutely handled in 1985 with apparent unanimity."v Professional
128. Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1966). The apparent reason for the decision was
that, under the 1948 constitutional amendment, a spousal partition of community property could create
separate property (as constitutionally defined) but somehow, while tenancy-in-common property was
separate, an intended joint tenancy was not shown to be so. The statute declared unconstitutional in
Williams was passed in response to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Hilley v. Hilley, 342 S.W.2d
565 (Tex. 1961).
129. A similar case came before the court before amendment was achieved. Maples v. Nimitz, 615
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1981). Another case based on facts occurring before the amendment was handled
similarly after the amendment was adopted. Allard v. Frech, 754 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1988).
130. The amendment provides that "spouses may agree in writing that all or part of their community
property becomes the property of the surviving spouse on the death of a spouse." 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws
4114, § 1.
131. 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978).
132. Beck v. Beck, 814 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex. 1991).
133. See Lindsay v. Clayman, 254 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1952); Dakan v. Dakan, 83 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.
1935); supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text; see also Joseph W. McKnight, A Retrospective
Assessment of Texas Family Property Law Reform, 15 CoM. PROP. J. 1, 8 (1988).
134. Anderson v. Gilliland, 684 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1985).
Page 71: Spring 1993]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
advisers of the legislature had shied away from a statutory solution of the
question because of lack of consensus, and the intermediate appellate courts had
interpreted the supreme court cases to produce almost every possible conflicting
result. After a long period of economic inflation, the view was widely held that
limiting reimbursement for improvements to their cost (in the Spanish manner)
was unjust. 35 Following this sentiment, the court concluded that recovery is
measured by enhancement in value, whether more or less than cost.13s
Although the court acknowledged that cost was a far easier standard to apply,
the court perceived that the estate providing the benefit was unjustly deprived
of its investment in the benefitted estate if recovery is limited to cost during a
period of inflation. As a period of economic recession has set in since the court
reached its decision, some resistance to the conclusion may be anticipated when
enhancement in value is less than cost. Another vice in the court's resolution of
the problem is the difficulty of applying the court's rule to cases of reimburse-
ment not involving improvements (as in the case of repayment of a mortgage
indebtedness on realty) to which the principle of enhancement is not clearly
applicable.
The court has also wrestled with the related problem of reimbursing the
community estate for increases in the value of a separate interest in a closely
held business entity.3 Thus far, the court has dealt with the consequences of
inadequate compensation of a spouse employed by a business in which he or she
owns a controlling separate interest. 1" The court has not yet examined the
issue of reimbursement for enhancement in value of a separate entity interest
attributable to retained earnings when the adequacy of compensation is not at
issue.1
39
Such legalistic matters are commonly seen as appropriate for judicial
resolution, whereas some broader matters of policy, more easily comprehended
by non-lawyers, have been regarded as more appropriate for legislative
treatment. One aspect of determining the scope of judicial authority to divide
marital property on divorce became so rankling and divisive within the supreme
court during the late 1970s and early 1980s that the court seemed inclined to
leave other related matters to legislative determination.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53. The Spanish commentators of the sixteenth century
had also wrestled with the problem of injustice of applying cost as a measure of reimbursement in an
inflating economy. See supra note 23.
136. Anderson, 684 S.W.2d at 675.
137. The issue was approached but not reached in McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.
1976) (a partnership case). See also Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982) (a corporation co-
owned by the community and the husband's separate estate).
138. Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984). Some aspects of the measure of reimbursement
may require further attention. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 38 Sw. L..
131, 137-39 (1984).
139. See Joseph W. McKnight, Reimbursement for Uncompensated Labor Rendered for a Closely-
Held Corporation and Some Other Comments on Jensen v. Jensen, in 3 STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
LITIGATION SECTION, THE ADVOCATE 8, 12-13 (Dec. 1984).
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Borrowing from an 1820 Alabama statute,1" the Congress of the Republic
of Texas in 1841 laid down two rules from which later Texas law has developed:
first, the divorce court might award alimony pendente lite,t14 and, second, on
divorce, the court might divide the parties' estate (with the exception of realty)
as it deemed "just and right."142 The first rule has provided the basis for the
conclusion that a divorce court cannot award permanent alimony (that is, support
of an ex-spouse after divorce).143 This issue of public policy is still debated and
has not yet been resolved. The second rule produced the concept of an equitable
division of the community estate within the discretion of the trial judge.1" The
attempt at clarification of this doctrine produced such acute division in the
supreme court that the court declined to be drawn into the debate concerning
permanent alimony.145
Adoption of the principle of equitable division of property on divorce in 1841
put Texas in the forefront of jurisdictions that had continuously adhered to that
approach. But the law remained unclear as to the scope of the divorce court's
power to divide separate as well as community property. In 1960, the Texas
Supreme Court finally decided1" that the restriction with respect to division of
realty applied only to separate realty, thus allowing division of all community
property, as well as separate personalty. In 1969, the professional advisers of the
140. An Act Concerning Divorce, 1820 ALA. GEN. LAWS 79, § 6. The statute empowered a divorce
court to "order a division of the estate of the parties" as seemed "just and right." Because Alabama was
not a community property jurisdiction, the reference was obviously to the separate property of each
spouse.
141. 1840-1841 Tex. Gen. Laws 19, § 6, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 483-84; TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.58(c)(2) (West 1993).
142. 1840-1841 Tex. Gen. Laws 19, § 4 at 20, reprinted in 2 GAMMEL, supra note 5, at 484; TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.63(a) (West 1993) without the exception.
143. See James W. Paulsen, Remember the Alamo[ny]! The Unique Texas Ban on Permanent
Alimony and the Development of Community Property Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Spring
1993).
144. In the early 1980s, the court twice concluded that marital fault may be considered in dividing
community property on divorce even when the ground for divorce is not based on fault. Murff v. Murff,
615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981); Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1980). Although these decisions may
be interpreted as constituting an insensitivity to the objective of no-fault divorce, the court's opinion is
more accurately viewed as a mere indication of its concern for maintaining the principle of judicial
discretion as the most important element in property division. Because most divorces prior to the
institution of the broad, no-fault ground (insupportability) in 1969 were consensual (or the consequences
of a bargain), insupportability was meant to replace cruelty as the most common ground for divorce and
to make the allegation more accurate. The unforeseen, and indeed catastrophic, consequence of the
reform was to sweep away the bargaining power of the innocent spouse, thus greatly reducing the
potential impact of the court's recent decision making contractual alimony enforceable. See Francis v.
Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967).
145. See Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 402-03 (Tex. 1979). In that instance, due to
federal preemption of the classification of assets, there was no significant community estate to divide.
The court rejected the suggestion that the court should fabricate an alimony remedy from federal
common law. See Northern Group Serv., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 94 (6th Cir. 1987)
(when state law is preempted by federal law, federal common law fills the gap); William A. Reppy, Jr.,
Learning to Live With Hisquierdo, 6 COM. PROP. J. 5 (1979).
146. Hailey v. Hailey, 331 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1960). The court did not look to Alabama law as the
legislative source of the Texas act. But the reference to realty in the Alabama statute was clearly to
separate property, because Alabama (a common law marital property jurisdiction) had no other kind.
Page 71: Spring 1993]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
legislature redrew the statute by omitting the prohibition of division of separate
realty but in doing so misadvised the legislature as to their purpose: The
legislature was told that the effect of the statute was unchanged. 47 An issue
of statutory construction was therefore presented to the supreme court in
1977.1' The court concluded that the legislature had not intended to repeal
the bar to division of separate realty149 and resorted to the constitution to
support its conclusion.
The nature of property is fixed by the Texas Constitution, and not by what is
"just and right." ... Section 15, article XVI, of the Texas Constitution declares
that a wife's property, owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that
acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent shall be the separate property of
the wife. By reason of legislation, the husband's property is classified the same
way. If one spouse's separate property may by a divorce decree be changed
from the separate property of the one spouse into the separate property of the
other, there is a type of separate property which is not embraced within the
constitutional definition of the term.15s
In a grander invocation of the Texas Constitution, the court asserted that a
divorce court's award of one spouse's separate property to the other would
constitute a governmental taking without a public purpose.151 These flights of
constitutional rhetoric cannot be taken very seriously. As a merely logical
proposition, the court's conclusion with respect to nondivestiture of title to
separate realty was nevertheless held to be applicable to separate personalty five
years later.15
2
In spite of the asserted constitutional dogma to support the conclusion that
separate property cannot be divided on divorce, the court in the later case153
also approved new legislation"54 allowing division of any property earned by
spouses while domiciled outside Texas. Thus, in a single decision, the court
forbade division on divorce of all constitutionally defined separate property but
allowed division of property acquired by non-Texans by means other than gift,
succession, and premarital earnings that nonetheless amounted to foreign
separate property. It was a remarkable exercise in strict, and very literal,
construction. Although the court had been sharply divided in precluding division
147. See Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TnX. TECH L. REV.
281, 337 (1974).
148. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
149. Id. at 139.
150. Id. at 140 (footnote omitted). By this same sort of argument, community property undivided
on divorce could not become a tenancy in common as concluded in Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551
(Tex. 1970).
151. TEX. CONST. OF 1876 art. I, § 19. An intermediate appellate court thereafter ruled that an
unequal division of community property on divorce was unconstitutional. Mendoza v. Mendoza, 621
S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1981, no writ). But see Rutledge v. Rutledge, 709 S.W.2d
389, reh'g denied, 711 S.W.2d 437, 720 S.W.2d 633, writ ref d n.r.e., cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
152. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 219-20 (Tex. 1981).
153. Id.
154. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.63(b) (enacted in 1981).
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of both separate realty and personalty,155 in 1992 a unanimous Texas Supreme
Court rejected imposition of a lien on separate realty to insure an equitable
division on divorce."5
Since 1967, legislative reforms of Texas family property law have responded
to decisions of the Texas Supreme Court in only a few instances,1 57 and then
mainly to correct legislative errors rather than to alter decisions of the highest
court unrelated to existing statutes. Judicial decisions that have prompted most
legislative acts for doctrinal correction have been those of the trial and
intermediate appellate courts.1 58  In 1972159 and again in 1987,"w the Texas
Supreme Court indicated a relaxed concern for the community presumption in
giving some recognition to the presumed intent of a spouse in attempting to
withdraw separate funds commingled with community property. Although these
cases slightly narrowed the effect of the community presumption, they were not
much criticized and provoked no recommendation for legislative change. Rather,
it was the inclination of some trial courts to make findings of separate property
on insufficient evidence that prompted the statute of 1987161 to require clear
and convincing evidence of separate property. Even so, some considerable doubt
about the efficacy of the earlier supreme court holdings must now be entertained.
Several factors have tended to keep law reform within the control of the
legislature. Whereas the bar regularly advises the legislature with respect to
improvements in family law that it deems advisable, the supreme court is
exposed only to a haphazard sampling of potential problems. When one
considers that about half of all disputes that make their way to Texas courts
involve family matters, the number of matrimonial property cases dealt with by
the court in recent decades has been relatively small because of errors presented
by other subjects that may seem in greater need of attention. Various other
causes have also contributed to this result. Because of the great number and
variety of cases presented to the court for review and some lack of continuity in
the membership and in interests of the court's members, there has been a
disinclination to deal with disputes whose resolution by the intermediate
appellate courts seems satisfactory. To these circumstances should be added the
statutory limitation imposed between 1892 and 1987 to hear divorce appeals, a
155. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982) (personalty); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554
S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977) (realty).
156. Heggen v. Pemelton, 836 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1992). In the interim, the court had declined to
extend legislative treatment of foreign separate acquistions on divorce to a case of succession. Estate
of Hanau v. Hanau, 730 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1987).
157. For example, Muller v. Evans, 516 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1974) caused revision of TEx. FAM. CODE
§ 5.22 (enacted in 1975) (allowing spouses to agree informally to manage their community property
otherwise than as statutorily prescribed).
158. The decision in Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975), merely contributed to
the confusion that prompted enactment of TEx. FAM. CODE § 4.031 and the amendment of TEX. FAM.
CODE § 5.61 (enacted in 1987) (clarifying personal liability of one spouse for obligations incurred by the
other).
159. McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1973).
160. Hanau, 730 S.W.2d at 667.
161. TEx. FAM. CODE § 5.02 (enacted in 1987).
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barrier that kept some unusual or novel property disputes162 from receiving the
court's consideration. Although this limitation persisted from a time when
divorces were relatively rare, regarded as socially abhorrent, and in most
instances deemed beneath the dignity of the supreme court's consideration, the
court used the old statute to justify its decision not to review an ever-increasing
number of divorce appeals, which sometimes presented matrimonial property
issues of considerable importance. All divorce cases that did not raise issues of
constitutional or statutory interpretation or conflicts within the intermediate
appellate courts were barred from review until 1987.1"
A striking instance of judicial inaction for lack of jurisdiction concerns the
definition of a spouse's constructive fraud in making a gift of community
property without the other spouse's consent. After widely spaced legislative
refusals to deal with the problem in 1840 and 19671" and a dismal prediction
on the part of the court in 19611" that a serviceable definition could not be
formulated, the intermediate appellate courts fashioned a seemingly acceptable
rule, and the supreme court has merely let it stand.1" Without commenting on
the issue of constructive fraud,167 the Texas Supreme Court then provided an
alternative response to the problem (in rare circumstances) by fastening an ill-
considered illusory transfer doctrine onto Texas marital property law.
162. See Kellett v. Kellett, 59 S.W. 809 (Tex. 1900); Burguieres v. Farrell, 87 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1935);
Lloyd v. Bonds, 217 S.W.2d 1000 (Tex. 1949); James P. Hart, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of Texas, 29 TEX. L. REV. 285, 307-09 (1951). There were few breaks in the barrier. See Bearden
v. Knight, 220 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. 1950); Korn v. Korn, 15 S.W.2d 1017 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929), motion
to modify judgm't denied, 29 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930). For cases that the court was
statutorily barred from hearing, see Bobbitt v. Bass, 713 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ
dism'd w.o.j.) (character of herd of livestock); Breeze v. Breeze, 707 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (sex bias in division on divorce); Carley v. Carley, 705 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (measure of reimbursement); Zisblatt v. Zisblatt, 693 S.W.2d
944 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (character of incorporated personal service
business); Estate of Korzekwa v. Prudential Ins. Co., 669 S.W.2d 775 (Tex App.-San Antonio 1984, writ
dism'd w.o.j.) (constructive fraud and reimbursement); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1980, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (professional skill as separate or community property);
Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52,60-61 (Tex Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd w.o.j.)
(gift of community as alleged constructive fraud). See also Moreno v. Alejanero, 775 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied) (division of tort recovery undivided on divorce); Andrie v.
Andrle, 751 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, writ denied) (characterization of post divorce
payments under structured settlement for tortious injury during marriage); Dewey v. Dewey, 745 S.W.2d
514 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (character of alleged gift).
163. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 1821(4) (1925) (codified as amended at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
22.225 (West 1988)). See also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art 1728(1)-(3), (6) (1925) (codified as amended
at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.001(a)(1)-(3), (6) (West 1988)).
164. See McKnight, supra, note 9, at 33 n.24, 53 n.145.
165. Hilley v. Hilley, 324 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1961).
166. Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1976, writ dism'd w.o.j.). See also
Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Givens v. Girard Life
Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
167. Land v. Marshall, 426 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1968). The petitioner's counsel had conceded that fraud
was not in issue.
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During the past twenty years, the court has periodically dealt with disputes
concerning community property left undivided on divorce."6  This series of
decisions nicely illustrates the process by which judicial handling of a particular
issue has served as a catalyst to legislative reform. The most common subject
matter of such disputes in all the appellate courts has been a former spouse's
retirement benefits, overlooked by the divorce court because the pensioner-
spouse had not yet retired. After concluding in 1970 that the nonpensioner ex-
spouse was not barred from recovery by the doctrine of res judicata and was
therefore entitled to an undivided half of a vested community pension
interest,169 the court went on to hold that an interest contingent at divorce but
subsequently vested should be handled in the same way.170 In that instance,
the court held that the community portion of the pension interest (acquired over
a period during which the pensioner was married for a while and single for the
rest of the time) was computed by a ratio of the number of months of marriage
to the entire number of months of employment. Focusing on the amount of the
nonpensioner's ex-spouse's recovery in 1983, the court reasoned that the
nonpensioner's share was merely half the value of the community interest on
divorce (as though the pensioner had retired at that time) rather than the value
reckoned by applying the ratio of the number of months of marriage to those
during which the entire interest accumulated. 171 The court, therefore, omitted
from the calculation the value of the nonpensioner's interest from the date of
divorce to the date of a postdivorce judgment. In the case before the court,
however, that amount was merely alleged but not proved. In a later case, 17
the court recognized the nonpensioner's right to postdivorce cost-of-living
increases in undivided pension benefits with the implication that other post-
divorce increases in value would also be recognized.
In response to this series of judicial opinions, the legislature in 1987 provided
a simpler (but only partial) solution to the problem of undivided community
interests: If recovery is sought within two years of an unequivocal denial of the
right to an undivided interest, the divorce court may make an equitable division
of the interest (rather than an equal partition).173 Unresolved in this course of
development is a clear determination of the burden of proof to show the value
of the competing separate and former community interests and their enhance-
168. The related problem of distinguishing between community properties of successive marriages
had been dealt with in Tarver v. Tarver, 394 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1965). The first community was not
divided on the death of the first wife. After the husband's second marriage and divorce, the second wife
sued for a division of the second community and prevailed over the ex-husband and his children of the
first marriage by application of the community presumption.
169. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
170. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
171. Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983). The court relied heavily on Herring v. Blakeley,
385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965), where the court had said that the value of an ex-spouse's community interest
in a profit-sharing plan earned by the other ex-spouse and payable on termination of his employment
(which occurred on his death) was determined at that time.
172. Grier v. Grier, 731 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1987).
173. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.90-3.93 (West 1993).
Page 71: Spring 1993]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
ment in value. In these instances, the community presumption is not applicable
because the community estate terminated on divorce and became a tenancy in
common of separate interests.174 Furthermore, despite a developing group of
Texas Supreme Court decisions and a number of inharmonious decisions from
the intermediate appellate courts dealing with the division of federal pension
rights17 affected by the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection
Act,176 legislative guidance in handling that subject has not been proposed.
V
CONCLUSION
One of the greatest difficulties in pursuing law reform in the legislature (as
well as in the courts) is to overcome each legislator's (or judge's) inclination to
consider every proposal or argument in the light of his or her familial situation.
In the legislature, the size of the deliberative body and the pressure of other
matters thought to be of more immediate importance contribute to overcoming
individual concerns, but in the courts the factor of personal interest frequently
produces inconsistency in appellate decisions." Because law reform has been
much more effectively pursued in the Texas legislature than in the courts, and
because of the leadership provided by the bar, Texas family property law has
been greatly modernized during the last twenty-five years, including necessary
alterations of the constitution. Although Texas stands alone among American
jurisdictions in ultimately regulating her family property law at the constitutional
level, the availability of constitutional restraint to allow judicial oversight of
legislation continues to be regarded as a desirable aspect of Texas law. Even so,
the legislature and its professional advisers sometimes cannot resist the
temptation to challenge the supreme court to rule on the constitutionality of a
dubious proposition. 7 8  On occasion the court has followed the legislative
initiative, and the court's rejection of a legislative solution has also prompted
constitutional reform.
174. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551.
175. See Allison v. Allison, 700 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); Cameron v. Cameron, 641
S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982); Trahan v. Trahan, 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981); Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d
61 (Tex. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); Berry, 786 S.W.2d 672.
176. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1989) (originally effective Feb. 1, 1983).
177. When one considers that two cases as different in analysis as Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390
(Tex. 1972), and Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972), were decided by the same court on the same
day, one also appreciates the possibility that a differently constituted court may see a later dispute similar
to one of those from a different perspective.
178. For recent examples, see TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4610 (West 1967); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 5.41 (West 1969 and 1981); and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.43(a)(1) (West 1987). See supra
notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
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